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Quantification and pathological individualization are the two dominant trends within 
homelessness research. In acquiring near-exclusive status in this research, they constitute a 
regime of truth and produce a series of unsustainable negations: they deny that they produce 
the realities which they study, they deny that other realities may be produced, they 
delegitimise any alternative methodological positionings, and render power relationships and 
domination invisible, thus obscuring the injustice of life on the streets. As an alternative to this 
regime of truth, this article argues for the mobilisation of a declared ontological politics that is 
concerned with the welfare and dignity of homeless people.  




There is a dominant regime of truth in homelessness research. It is composed of two 
separate but complementary aspects, namely the tendency towards quantification and 
pathological individualization of the phenomenon. This regime of truth, like any other, 
constitutes the materialisation of certain realities produced by the research process itself, 
which can only be accomplished at the cost of actively rendering alternative realities invisible 
(Foucault, 1978, 1991; Mol, 2002; Foucault, 2003; Law, 2004; Santos, 2006, 2007). However, 
the main problem of this dominant position is not the fact that it creates absences: they are 
an integral part of the methodological process of making sense of the world. What does 
prove problematic is (1) the process by which invisibilities are transformed into negations, 
with the result that all realities not present in the dominant methodological practice are 
viewed as impossibilities, thus reducing the field of possibilities to what is made to exist; and 
(2) the fact that the particular absences created by this regime of truth are essential to 
understanding homelessness as something characterised, above all else, by injustice and 
e t e e do i atio . B  e phasisi g the ajo  statisti al t e ds  of the phe o e o , this 
regime produces a superficial view of homelessness that prevents access to the plurality of 
ways of thinking and acting that characterise it, leaving out of the produced reality actors, 
spaces and interactions that are vital to the study of life on the streets. Assigning individual 
                                                        
* Article published in RCCS 97 (June 2012).  
I would like to thank Sílvia Portugal for her careful reading of the various versions of this text and for her 
suggestions, and Teresa Tavares for her help with the translation of the article. All the problems that remain, 
however, are entirely my responsibility. 
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causes to a phenomenon that occurs for structural reasons helps naturalise – and, in 
extremis, deny – problems in the housing and labour markets and in state and institutional 
a tio s i  the elfa e  se to , thus p o idi g suppo t fo  a pa ti ula  a  of la i g the 
i ti s  fo  thei  situation.  
Concern for the wellbeing and dignity of those who are homeless does not allow 
researchers to be complicit in the reproduction and reinforcement of this regime of truth. It 
is essential to carry out an exercise in ontological politics (Mol, 2002; Law, 2004) which allows 
another reality of the phenomenon of homelessness to be produced1: an ontological politics 
that recognises the multiplicity, complexity and fluidity of its different features and does so 
by emphasising the concern to improve the living conditions of homeless actors. However, 
we also need an ontological politics that explicitly defines itself as such and that, unlike the 
prevailing regime of truth, which denies making choices about what it makes present and 
absent, explains the reasons why certain presences are preferable to others, as well as 
openly acknowledging the fact that it creates absences. This exercise should function on two 
complementary time frames. The first involves the initial step towards a concerned and 
declared ontological politics: a rejection of rendering invisible the domination and injustice 
that characterize homelessness. Since it is only by taking injustice and domination into 
account that it is possible to combat them, the second political ontological moment is 
concerned, by necessity, with the collective production of a more just reality, which does not 
include people living on the streets.  
I will begin by reflecting on the dominant regime of truth in what concerns the two 
dimensions referred to above. My main argument is not that these research positions 
correspond to incorrect perspectives, since this would have to be based on the idea that 
                                                        
1
 In the sense of enactment, which should be distinguished from construction. Both concepts refer to the idea 
that the objects and realities studied are brought into existence by the methodological practices deployed to 
study them and that there is no reality external to these practices. However, the concept of construction 
supposes that these methodological practices stabilise gradually and also stabilise the objects/realities which 
they study – produce. Bearing in mind that the denial that they produce the realities being studied is an integral 
part of the very practices that produce them, the concept of construction is based on the idea that the realities 
being studied and the practices used to study them may gain sufficiently general acceptance for one of the 
multiple practices and one of the possible multiple realities to acquire the appearance of exclusivity. The idea 
that these practices may be altered, thus changing the reality that has been made to exist, is not ignored, but 
the cost of such alterations is emphasised. The concept of enactment rejects this possibility of unique 
stabilisation. It acknowledges that there may be stabilisations, but these will always be multiple, depending on 
the various practices deployed in each space-time. Thus, enactment has a performative dimension: the realities 
which practices make present only remain present while the practices are executed. On the notion of 
enactment, see Mol (2002) and Law (2004). 
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there is a reality of homelessness that is exterior to the methodological practices deployed to 
study it. I do not believe that such an exterior reality exists, and therefore the issue in 
question is not one of perspective.2 It extends further than this: quantification and 
pathological individualization, rather than perspectives, are the wrong methods3 for studying 
and producing a phenomenon characterised by domination and injustice. They make present 
parts of the reality of the phenomenon that do not contribute towards understanding or 
solving it (the use of drugs and alcohol and mental illness), and render absent the 
fundamental realities of life on the streets (the labour market and housing, the role of the 
state, the survival strategies of those who live on the streets, disrespect, stigmatisation, 
social disqualification and poverty). As an alternative, I defend a methodological position that 
explicitly acknowledges itself as a process that produces reality, that creates presences and 
absences, that states the reasons why certain presences are more desirable or necessary 
than others, that clarifies what it makes invisible, and does all this on the basis of a concern 
                                                        
2
 Throughout the text, the fundamental epistemological distinction between perspectivism and constructivism 
will be deployed, introducing into the discussion the idea of ontological politics, understood as a particular type 
of constructivism. In broad terms, I understand perspectivism to be a methodological position that conceives of 
the reality being studied as something external to the methodological process of supplying meaning for the 
o ld. He e, ethodolog  is ot a atte  of p odu i g  ut dis o e i g  a ealit , a d the diffe e t a s of 
describing and analysing it are conditioned by the different positions which the subjects occupy in the world, 
leadi g to sepa ate ie s  of the sa e ealit , hi h is the efo e app oa hed f o  diffe e t standpoints. In 
this a , the possi ilit  of ag ee e t et ee  pe spe ti es,  i  the se se of app oa hi g the correct reality, is 
something contemplated by perspectivism. Constructivism, on the other hand, rejects the unity of the real, 
affirming that the actual differentiated positioning of the subjects creates different realities. As this is not a 
solipsistic position, this construction of reality is a collective exercise, carried out by relational networks rather 
than isolated individuals (no isolated element in the network has total control over the reality they all produce), 
from which different phenomena result which, in discursive terms, are often given the same name. Ontological 
politics emerges as a way of clarifying certain constructivist premises. Firstly, it accentuates the relational 
nature of the production of reality, contesting certain constructivist lines which, whilst taking interaction as a 
ta it sta ti g assu ptio , do ot ake this e pli it, thus eati g o fusio  et ee  o st u ti is  a d 
solipsis .  I  aki g o tologi al politi s the e t e of the ethodologi al p o edu e, e a e fo ed to a ept 
that realities exist outside individual perceptions, yet there are no realities outside the meanings that are 
constructed by a relational network. In addition, a methodology that makes its political ontological nature 
explicit reveals a possible dimension of intentionality in the production of realities: if these are performed by 
interactionally linked individuals, it is then plausible that, collectively, they may strive to enact them in a 
politically or morally desirable way.  
3
 It becomes essential to deploy a broad concept of method. In doing so, it becomes clear that any 
methodological position has a political dimension. The methodological choices we make are far from reducible 
to the different techniques for producing information, and even less reducible to taking a position on the 
ua titati e/ ualitati e  di hoto . Taki g the otio  of o tologi al politi s as its ase, a o al positioning 
concerned with the welfare and dignity of the actors whose lives are being studied obliges the researcher to 
contribute towards improving their living conditions through the work s/he is doing, which should enable a 
better world to be produced, namel   e eali g the elatio al i e ualities that edu e e tai  i di iduals  life 
possi ilities. I u de sta d o g  ethods to e all those hi h, o e sel , o t i ute i  so e a  to a ds 
reproducing a status quo in the distribution of power that continues to hurt actors already being hurt in the 
studied phenomena.  
RCCS Annual Review, 5, October 2013                                                                                                                                     Investigating Homelessness 
67 
that results from the indignation felt by the researcher in the face of the oppression and 
injustice that characterise homelessness.  
 
How a y ho eless are there a d who are they ?  
There is no consensual definition of homelessness in space or time or amongst institutions 
and researchers.4 The only thing that all the definitions seem to have in common is the fact 
that they are based on what lacks to the individuals who live on the streets: the lack of 
housing, social ties, money, physical and/or mental health, etc. Not only does a consensual 
definition not exist, but more than this, it cannot exist, given that the homeless do not 
o stitute a sepa ate atego  f o  the est of so iet  ut a e pa t of a continuum of 
precariousness – in housing, to a large extent – together with the domiciled population. The 
ho eless  atego  o l  e ists to the e te t that it is eated  the ethodologi al 
practices deployed by researchers, by professionals who work with subjects living on the 
streets and by policymakers who work on the phenomenon.  
These actors consider the conceptual range of the definition to be an essential issue. It 
wavers between very restricted definitions – to e ho eless  stricto sensu, literally sleeping 
o  the st eet o  i  so e othe  pu li  spa e ot desti ed fo  this pu pose – and other very 
oad defi itio s, i  hi h ei g ho eless  e o es li ked to a d o fused ith a  
other situations of precariousness and vulnerability, in particular housing vulnerability 
(Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi, 1999; Brousse, 2005; Gaboriau and Terrolle, 2009).  
Definitions with different ranges will always produce different figures for the number of 
individuals living on the streets. In general, non-government institutions use broader 
definitions and state institutions more restricted ones, duly resulting in larger or smaller 
ho eless populatio s.  This diffe e e also o igi ates – in a complementary way – from the 
a  i  hi h the ho eless  a e ou ted. F o  a statistical point of view, it is possible to 
easu e  this populatio  as stock – considering the number of subjects that correspond 
to a gi e  defi itio  of ho eless  at a pa ti ula  poi t i  ti e – or as flow – taking the 
number of individuals that co espo d to a gi e  defi itio  of ho eless  o e  a pe iod of 
                                                        
4
 There are various discussions regarding definitions of homeless(ness). Brousse (2005), Jacobs, Kemeny and 
Manzi (1999) and Damon (2008: 2-7, 129-148) consider it necessary to define a population, despite identifying 
various problems in the process. The qualitative positions of Hopper (1997), Rullac (2012), Zeneidi-Henry (2002: 
16-50) and, in particular, Gaboriau (2004) and Gaboriau and Terrolle (2009) appear more interesting, being 
characterised by rejections of a definition, which they consider unnecessary for a conception of homelessness 
that emphasises its procedural links with other situations of structural poverty and domination. 
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time (for instance, one year).5 Go e e ts usuall  p efe  to easu e the ho eless 
populatio  as sto k, gi e  that the figu es a e al a s lo e  tha  those fo  flo , a d 
institutions that do not depend directly on the government in general opt for measurements 
of flow. NGOs that work with homeless people have a clear interest in justifying their 
existence and institutional continuity and therefore need funding. Using a broad definition of 
ho eless  to suppo t easu e e t  flo  ill p o ide figu es that a e al a s u h 
higher than those measured by stock based on a more restricted definition. If the available 
p odu ed  statisti al data allo  us to state that the e a e a  ho eless i di iduals,  it 
will then be necessary to preserve the institutions that work with them. Conversely, it is in 
the interest of governments to publicly present a relatively low number of homeless 
individuals in order to downplay the problem. Moreover, measurement by flow will always 
sho  a highe  u e  of i di iduals ho a e te po a il  ho eless, i.e. ho do ot li e o  
the streets for long periods of time, whereas measurement by stock will overrepresent the 
u e  of the h o i  ho eless,  i.e. those ho ha e een homeless for several years.  
The multiple forms of calculation make quantification problematic, to say the least, if not 
impossible. However, additional issues relating to practical difficulties should also be 
mentioned. The fact that various homeless individuals cannot be visually identified as such 
(Gaboriau, 2004: 115-116; Damon, 2008: 3; Gaboriau and Terrolle, 2009; Rullac, 2012) or the 
difficulty in gaining access to many of the sleeping places that these individuals choose for 
reasons of privacy and protection – often in spaces where people may walk past without 
realising that a human being is sleeping just a few metres away (Pichon, 1996, 2002; 
Gaboriau, 2004: 115-116) – make it difficult to accept that it is possible to obtain 
representative figures fo  the ho eless populatio .  The possi ilit  of a i g out a su e  
i  olla o atio  ith the elfa e  i stitutio s that o k ith people li i g o  the st eets 
would not help in obtaining data that could be interpreted as representative either – at least, 
not representative of the population which the study intends to cover. Several homeless 
individuals shun contact with these institutions and will not eat or spend the night in them 
(Snow and Anderson, 1993; Pichon, 1996, 2002; Gaboriau, 2004; Damon, 2008: 228-229; 
                                                        
5
 O  issues ega di g ethods fo  al ulati g the ho eless  populatio , see B ousse  fo  a ie  hi h, 
whilst identifying their problems, defends the usefulness of quantification. See Gaboriau (2004) for a firm 
rejection of the quantitative position. Between total rejection of quantification (Gaboriau) and the search for 
solutions to the problems of calculation (Brousse), Damon (2008: 129-148) stands closer to the latter than the 
former position. Hopper (1997) and Zeneidi-Henry (2002: 38-42) are further removed from Brousse, defending 
qualitative methodologies but without the fierce criticisms of quantification levelled by Gaboriau. 
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Rullac, 2012; Gowan, 2010). They cannot therefore be found in institutional facilities and, in 
the case of various subjects, no institution can say where they sleep at night. These 
individuals will not figure in any statistical survey said to e ep ese tati e of the ho eless 
populatio ,  ega dless of the ethod hose  to gathe  the data. I  the fi al a al sis, 
i stitutio al o ta t does ot se e to defi e a  ho eless populatio ,  ut o l  to eate a 
conceptual distinction (whether inte tio al o  ot  et ee  those ith se u e housi g  a d 
i di iduals ho a e use s of se i es.   
It is impossible for researchers to safeguard themselves from these questions by resorting 
to a ep ese tati e  sa ple p o edu e hi h allo s the  to ig o e individuals who are 
impossible to contact. Given that it is not possible to count these subjects, we cannot know 
how many they are, and therefore how can we work on the basis that they are residual for a 
statistical survey of this population?  
In short, the only populations about whom quantitative data can be produced are the 
ide tifia le ho eless  o  the st eets o  i  i stitutio s ega dless of the defi itio  used  
a d the use s of se i es  Ga o iau, ; Ga o iau a d Te olle, . Ho e e , studies 
efe i g to ho eless i di iduals that a e epeatedl  take  to e ep ese tati e  of this 
population have thus the perverse characteristic of actually referring to another population. 
As Gaboriau and Terrolle state,  
In short, the survey is feasible. It has already been done. It will be done today with the 
guarantee of competent statisticians and experts. It will allow for substantial funding. It will 
p o ide the illusio  of the ua tifia le a d the k o  – if ua tit  is ette  defi ed, e 
feel we are in control of the situation. This apparent rigour will serve as an alibi for some cause 
or another. But it will provide a figure that does not correspond to the population of homeless 
people. (2009: 15)  
These problems mean that there are no reliable statistics for homelessness (Blau, 1992: 
15-30; Hopper, 1997; Gaboriau, 2004; Zeneidi-Henry, 2002: 38-49; Damon, 2008: 139-144). 
Given the enormous difficulties regarding quantification, the validity of any future statistics 
produced on the problem may also be questioned. Even if the data produced were reliable, 
would it help us to understand the living conditions of people on the streets? Given that data 
reliability is low or non-existent and that, even if this were not the case, a quantification of 
the number of people living on the streets would not serve to understand how they live, it is 
easo a le to state that the u e  of these ho eless people does ot help us to 
u de sta d the  ette  o  to pe ei e the ealit  of thei  o d to so iet  Gui e t-Lassalle, 
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2006: 46). This being the case, we should view any figures for the number of homeless 
individuals – whether officially, institutionally or academically produced – with less than full 
confidence, regardless of the definitions or statistical procedures used.6 The only thing we 
know for certain about the phenomenon is that there are too many individuals living on the 
streets. We do not know this because there are 500 of them, or 5,000, but because, as 
Ma hado Pais states, it does ot atte  to e ho  many [homeless individuals] there are – 
e e  o e ould e too a  : .  
Mo e tha  ei g i po ta t to stud i g the phe o e o , defi i g hat ei g ho eless  
means is vital for its statistical quantification, since these calculations serve to support 
politi al easu es. The a  i  hi h people a e defi ed as ho eless  is a po e  
mechanism that classifies particular individuals in a particular social position, reinforcing a 
position of structural domination (Gaboriau, 2004: 113-115). In other words, as previously 
stated, the ethodologi al p a ti e of defi i g a ho eless populatio  is a ea s of 
eati g the ho eless  as a atego . This atego  ill al a s e dis ualified i  a ious 
ways – not least because it is based on what subjects lack – and it will be on this basis that 
the institutions working with homeless individuals will find justification for intervening over 
those who live on the streets in a way that denies their capacity to act and think. There are 
therefore political aspects to the defi itio  of ho eless  that ust e o side ed Hoppe , 
1997; Zeneidi-Henry, 2002: 16-50; Gaboriau, 2004; Damon, 2008: 2-7, 129-148; Rullac, 2012). 
Through this categorisation, homeless individuals are generally represented as a 
ho oge eous g oup,  de ying the huge diversity of situations, behaviours, biographies and 
worldviews of people who live on the streets. This homogenisation facilitates the 
de elop e t of pu li  poli ies, gi e  that the  te d to e ie ed as ha i g a si gle o je t.  
Since the actual empirical heterogeneity of homelessness is ignored, these policies will target 
an abstract subject produced as real, rather than concrete individuals. Thus, this political 
treatment of the phenomenon will always result in a mismatch between the policy targets 
and the subjects to which they are applied.  
As stated at the beginning of this section, there is a total continuity between situations of 
domination, poverty and precariousness (whether housing-related or other) experienced by 
                                                        
6
 As an example, it is with this reduced degree of certainty that we should view the data which tells us that 
there were 1,377 homeless individuals, in the restricted sense, in Portugal in 2007-  data ot statisti all  
ep ese tati e  of the ou t , ut gathe ed i  Lis o  i   a d i  Coi a a d A ado a i   Edga , 
2009: 74). 
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a to s ith  a d ithout  ho es. If the e is o st aightfo a d di ide et ee  ith  a d 
ithout a ho e,  the  it is ot possi le to defi e a d statisti all  al ulate a ho eless 
populatio  Ga o iau, ; Ga o iau a d Te olle, . Thus, a defi itio  of 
homelessness is of little sociological use. Failing to define it does not make it difficult to 
study; on the contrary, it revalues the empirical, which comes to be seen as the only valid 
source for determining whether the individuals with whom the researcher interacts may or 
a  ot e o side ed ho eless.  A  defi itio , hethe  oade  o  o e est i ted, ill 
always be an exercise in dichotomous compartmentalisation of reality and this should be 
avoided: it is precisely by looking at the interaction between those ith  a d ithout a 
ho e  that it is possi le to p odu e so iologi all  ele a t o k.  
I  additio , a defi itio  ased o  hat these su je ts la k  has the i ediate effe t of 
o s u i g hat the  ha e.  This a  ot e u h, a d it a  e e  e de astating in its 
scarcity – ever-present in their daily lives – but it does not mean that we should ignore what 
they have: representations of the world and of themselves, desires, knowledges, capacities, 
values, feelings. The question posed by Gaboriau and Te olle is i pe ati e: Could t e talk 
about the wretched in some other way, in terms of what they think, with their outlook on life 
a d o  ou  so iet ?  : . Ho eless ess esea h has to look oth at hat i di iduals 
lack and what they possess; it has to recognise the voice of those who live in the misery 
which is life on the streets without ignoring the fact that this misery is real and limiting. 
Academic-scientific discourse on the phenomenon has to be constructed with those who live 
on the streets and take into account how they see their situation.  
 
Pathological individualization  
The pathological individualization of homelessness features as the other dominant 
methodological stance, which very often supplements quantification. There are two ideal-
typical registers for pathological individualization: (1) one derived from the medical model; 
a d  a othe  efe i g to the a o alit  of ho eless su je ts, ep ese ted as a to s ho 
reject the domiciled normativity of the rest of society. In socio-historical terms, the latter 
prevailed up to the early 20th century, emphasising that homeless individuals were to blame 
fo  thei  situatio  a d fo usi g o  thei  a o alit , lazi ess a d possi le  da ge ous ess.  
During the period of strong state regulation and relative economic prosperity that followed 
the Second World War, the structural dimensions of poverty began to be emphasised, and 
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attention was paid to the factors that led certain groups and subjects into dominated 
situations (Castel, 1996, 2003; Gowan, 2010).  
Since the 1980s the medical model has gradually established itself as the guiding force 
behind the definitions, representations and actions of domiciled society to address 
homelessness and people who live on the street. It is now the official positio  of elfa e  
institutions and prevails in academic-scientific research. This model conceives of the 
phenomenon as a series of individual cases, viewing the fact that people live on the streets as 
a symptom of individual disturbances or disorders (Blau, 1992; Lyon-Callo, 2008; Gowan, 
2010). It is therefore a perspective that argues that what is needed is to identify and treat 
i di idual p o le s. Medi all , ho eless ess [is] eithe  the esult of i i alit  o  so ial 
injustice [...] but a symptom – of addiction, mental frailties, post-traumatic stress syndrome 
a d othe  si k esses  Go a , : iii . Thus the ideal-typical medical model distances 
itself f o  the a o alisi g  egiste  ut o t i utes as u h as the latte  to a ds a ti el  
rendering invisible the systemic aspects of homelessness (Gowan, 2010).  
For Conrad, 
medicalization consists of defining a problem in medical terms, using medical language to 
describe a problem, adopting a medical framework to understand a problem, or using a 
edi al i te e tio  to t eat  it. This is a so io ultu al p o ess that a  o  a  ot i ol e 
the medical profession, lead to medical social control or medical treatment, or be the result of 
intentional expansion by the medical profession. Medicalization occurs when a medical frame 
or definition has been applied to understand or manage a problem. (1992: 211) 
It is therefore a process by which a particular phenomenon comes to be understood and 
managed in accordance with an analytical framework derived from the medical model. 
Whilst the medical profession does not necessarily have to be involved in the process, its 
presence reinforces the domination of medicalization as a means of observing and dealing 
with the phenomenon. Three separate but complementary levels of medicalization can be 
identified: i) a conceptual level, in which a medical vocabulary is deployed to frame the 
phenomenon; ii) an institutional level, in which the organisations involved use a medical 
approach to deal with a specific problem within their area of expertise; iii) and an 
interactional level, in which the direct doctor–patient relationship is present and in which the 
former defines and (medically) treats an individual problem that may or may not be social in 
origin (and therefore, in empirical terms, not a pathology of the subject-patient). It is only on 
this third level that the medical profession is always involved (ibidem: 211).  
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The involvement of the medical profession is not a conditio sine qua non for the 
medicalization of a phenomenon. In recent decades, the medical model has been extended 
to various aspects of society, and several professions not directly linked to medicine have 
begun using a medicalizi g dis ou se. The apa it  to edi all  defi e eha iou s a d 
people – for Conrad (1992), the main indicator of the power of the medical model – is 
present in various research studies on homelessness originating in psychology and social 
work, among others, which use medical frameworks to approach the problem and see the 
identification of individual pathologies in each homeless person as their principal concern. 
The main objective of such studies is to discover – define, produce – the e tal ill ess  o  
alcohol and/or drug addiction that prevents a particular homeless individual from getting off 
the st eets a d i teg ati g  i to do i iled so iet . I  this egiste , the solutio  fo  getti g 
off the streets (not for ending homelessness, but for each individual exit) lies in the personal 
conversion of the individual, in his/her adaptation to a society which, although it may be 
seen as unjust, is above all naturalised (Blau, 1992; Lyon-Callo, 2008; Gowan, 2010). The 
individualization of causes and solutions for homelessness renders invisible the structural 
factors that make certain su je ts ho eless,  a d thus ho eless ess o es to e see  as a 
s pto  of the se e e e tal ill ess a d su sta e a use of the fe  a d [as ha i g] little 
to do ith o ki g a d housi g o ditio s fo  the a  Go a , : . As a 
consequence of the do i a e of the edi al odel, the atego  of the e tall  ill a d 
de ia t ho eless  is eated a d ho oge ised; it is a atego  that is sepa ate f o  the 
est of so iet  a d hose e iste e is ot due to the a  i  hi h so iet  is o ga ised, but 
rathe  to i di idual fa to s that diffe e tiate ho eless  su je ts f o  those ho a e 
do i iled  Blau, ; L o -Callo, 2008; Gowan, 2010).  
In rejecting the medical model as a means of constructing knowledge on homelessness, it 
should be borne in mind that  
systemic inequities contribute to the production of many behaviors that are commonly read as 
pathological disorders among people without permanent shelter. Reading these behaviors as 
individual disorders certainly plays a role in silencing work against exploitative social conditions 
and in limiting our ability to work more effectively against the condition that [this] work 
documents. (Lyon-Callo, 2008: 52) 
Various behaviours on the part of homeless individuals which are taken to be indicators of 
pathologies  a e o e o  less effi ie t a s of deali g ith the ha sh ess of life o  the 
st eets. Ho e e , ith the edi alizatio  of so ial p o le s, it e o es o o  se se to 
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understand the coping strategies of homeless people as symptoms and evidence of mental 
ill ess  ibidem: . A o gst othe  thi gs, the edi alizatio  of e tai  eha iou s tu s 
the ho eless  i to the passi e i ti s  of pathologies, de i g the  the apa it  to a t 
and reflect on the world and on themselves, socially and morally justifying that they should 
e iopoliti all  a aged  elfa e  a d ep essi e i stitutio s.  
The edi al odel a d the a o alisi g  egiste  a e ideal t pes. I  praxis – including 
the praxis of production of academic-scientific knowledge – the two models combine, 
eati g a  a het pe of the ho eless  i di idual that is ha a te ized si ulta eousl   
e tal ill ess, d ug addi tio , al oholis , lazi ess, a o alit  a d i i alit ; the efo e, 
this individual must be taught to i teg ate  i to so iety. In practice, the medical model is 
not axiologically neutral but, on the contrary, incorporates moral considerations, leading to 
the o ple e ta it  of ep essi e  a d elfa e  p a ti es a d dis ou ses Feld a , ; 
Lyon-Callo, 2008; Gowan, 2010). The dominant research trend is therefore not reduced to 
the ideal-typical medical model but refers to pathological individualization in general, 
hethe  this o u s u de  the egiste  of e tal ill ess  o  so io ultu al de ia e,  o  
even (as is more common) a combination of both.  
Pathological individualization combines with quantification, with the latter contributing a 
great deal to the former. Given that, as seen in the previous section, there are more 
ho eless  he  the populatio  is easu ed as flow rather than as a stock, and that 
calculating them according to the latter restricts the population to a group of subjects who 
have been on the streets for a long time – and therefore can be supposed to be more 
adapted to these living conditions – a restricted definition that supports quantification by 
stock fa ilitates the pathologisatio  of the phe o e o  W ight a d ‘u i , : -46; 
O “ulli a , : . This fa ilitatio  of pathologisatio  esults f o  the a se e of a 
longitudinal view of measurements by stock, which can also lead to confusion between the 
causes of homelessness (i.e. the reasons why subjects end up on the streets) and the effects 
of life on the street which, at most, may be causes for the persistence of homelessness (i.e. 
the reasons why subjects remain on the streets). This confusion may lead to psychological, 
drug and alcohol problems being interpreted as the causes of the phenomenon when in 
reality they may be derived from the situation of living on the streets, and may therefore be 
factors that partly explain why certain individuals remain homeless (Blau, 1992: 17; Phelan 
and Link apud O “ulli a , : . “o e ethods of statisti al p odu tio  disto t the 
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phenomenon more than others, facilitating pathological individualization, but all statistical 
p odu tio  has a disto ti g effe t. As Blau states, so ial s ie e esea h [...] o siste tl  
tu s de og aphi  ha a te isti s i to auses of ho eless ess  : .  
 
A declared and concerned ontological politics 
As with any other method, quantification and pathological individualization produce specific 
realities; each of these methods constructs a particular kind of homelessness, mobilising 
specific practices, discourses, actors and materialities and does so by studying concrete 
spatial-temporal contexts. Like any other method, quantification and pathological 
individualization make parts of homelessness present, and do so at the cost of rendering 
other parts invisible (Law, 2004). In conceiving of the issue in this way, the problem of 
quantification and pathological individualization is not that they are wrong perspectives. The 
argument of this text aims to extend beyond perspectivism, considering that quantification 
and pathological individualization are wrong methods, incapable of producing realities that 
take into account the enormous power differences and structural domination that 
characterize homelessness.  
We are not facing a problem of perspective since, if we were, we would have to believe 
that there is one essentialist reality of homelessness that can be discovered through the 
correct use of certain methodologies. This is not the case. This phenomenon, like any other, 
is produced by the methodological practice itself (Mol, 2002; Law, 2004). The problem with 
quantification and pathological individualization is the fact that, whilst being as selective 
about the realities they produce as any other method, they do not acknowledge this. The 
reality of homelessness they produce is brought into existence at the cost of annulling 
alternative realities. It constitutes a regime of truth (Foucault, 1978, 1991, 2003), a particular 
representation of the possibilities of reality. It is a regime of truth that is as much discursive 
as material – discourse is, in itself, materiality but, pu sui g Fou ault s efle tio s ased o  
the ideas of Law (2004), Mol (2002) and Latour (1987), a regime of truth is also constituted 
by things, objects, and the physical practices of subjects. The regime of truth constituted by 
the combination of quantification and pathological individualization has to be deconstructed 
since, given its dominant character, it denies that other realities of homelessness exist or 
may exist. The statements which these methods make about the phenomenon acquire the 
status of (quasi) exclusivity, and are thus uncritically accepted by the media, politicians, 
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ordinary citizens and the sections of academia that dominate research in this area. New 
statements will be produced based on them, supported by a spiralling process that, as it 
advances, has the effect of increasingly hiding the choices which these methods make, in 
particular the realities of the phenomenon which are repeatedly made invisible7 – public 
policies that are incapable of ensuring a dignified standard of living for those who live on the 
streets, deregulation of the housing and labour markets, the capacity of homeless actors to 
act and reflect, the unofficial interactions in which they are involved, the multiple survival 
strategies they are forced to develop in the face of the failure of the state and the market, 
etc.8 As Law (2004) and Latour (1987) argue, a fundamental part of the process of knowledge 
production – of reality production – is its retrospective annulment. Its production context is, 
to a great extent, negated by its justification context (Feyerabend, 1993).  
Since the reality of homelessness is produced by the methodological practices we mobilise 
to understand it, the truth about this reality is also produced by these practices and is not, 
therefore, a criterion for knowledge validation (Foucault, 1978, 1991; Mol, 2002; Foucault, 
2003; Law, 2004). It could only be so if there was only one reality of homelessness, exterior 
to the practices of knowledge production, passive, coherent with itself, and able to be 
discovered through the use of various methods. If this were the case, we could argue that 
one perspective on it would be better than another and seek the appropriate method for 
accessing this reality. However, we are not in this kind of situation. Homelessness is 
characterised above all by its fractionality (Mol, 2002; Law, 2004). It is multiple – composed 
of the failures in the labour and housing markets, failures of the state, the subjectivities and 
survival strategies of those who live on the streets, the set of institutional disciplinary and 
elfa e  easu es, the dis ou ses a out it, a d all the othe  fa to s that a  e i luded i  
a discussion of the subject. Yet it is multiple without being plural, it is more than one without 
being various: all the different realities of homelessness that we can identify, that we can 
produce, are linked. They combine, coordinate and cooperate in complex ways, contributing 
                                                        
7
 On the process of producing statements in scientific practice in general, see Latour (1987) and Law (2004). 
8
 However, the statements of those who defend this regime of truth do not go unquestioned, and various 
authors, although still a minority within academia, have contested them. The work of Gaboriau and Terrolle 
(Gaboriau, 2004; Gaboriau and Terrolle, 2007, 2009), Lyon-Callo (2008), Gowan (2010), Hopper (1997, 2003) 
and Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) are exercises in the deconstruction of quantification and individualized 
pathologisatio ,   aki g isi le the st u tu al a d i te a tio al dimensions of homelessness which the 
dominant regime of truth renders invisible. These authors, in different ways, use ethnographic approaches to 
produce alternative realities of homelessness, emphasising the domination and injustice that are present in the 
lives of homeless actors. Despite the heterogeneity of their work, it is possible to find a common positioning on 
homelessness, one which I share. 
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to constructing one reality of homelessness with an apparent singularity, and this is achieved 
by reducing what may exist to what is actively made to exist, turning the realities produced 
by quantification and pathological individualization into a single reality with the status of 
exclusivity and denying the existence and legitimacy of the alternative realities that are made 
invisible in the process.  
It is useless to study homelessness if we do not feel outraged by the fact that there are 
people living on the streets, who are oppressed, hungry, cold, treated without respect, 
without dignity. To study homelessness is useless if we do not feel revolted when we see 
these people s apa it  to a t de ied as the  a e o st u ted eified  as e tall  ill,  o  
when we see them in possession of a purely negative action when they are constructed 
(reified) as i i al a d idle.  It is this ealit  of do i atio  a d i justi e that should e 
studied. In order to do so, we need different methods from those which have acquired the 
status of near-exclusivity. We need a broader understanding of method – a method 
assemblage (Law, 2004) – that allows us to make present the injustice of life on the streets, 
the institutionally produced elements of domination, the suffering felt by concrete bodies, 
the indignation of homeless actors over this, and the panoply of power relations that can be 
observed in the interactions in which they are involved. This exercise should be carried out 
openly and must assume a concern for a better world, a desire for the elimination of the 
enormous power differences that disqualify those who live on the streets, and a recognition 
that the only way to do this is to eliminate the existence of people living on the streets. We 
need a methodological positioning that explicitly places the researcher in the field and 
acknowledges his/her influence over the research and its influence over him/her. We need a 
methodological approach which assumes that the researcher considers that there are some 
realities of homelessness that are more important to produce than others, given that not all 
can be present simultaneously (Law, 2004). However, this being the case, this declared 
commitment to the construction of a particular reality through the mobilised methodological 
practice also implies that the realities that are deliberately made absent are made explicit. 
This does not mean that all of them should be made explicit in the same way – multiplicity 
would make this impossible – but that we should, at least, clarify that we are producing 
absences during the research process, that we are aware of doing so and that we want to do 
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so – to make present the structural dimensions of the phenomenon, to openly make absent 
the e tal ill ess  of ho eless a to s, to ake i pli itl  a se t othe  ealities.9  
If it is not the search for truth but the production of reality(ies) that directs 
methodological practice, then methodology is a political problem par excellence. Method is 
the means of producing the realities that we, as a society, are interested in producing. It 
therefore becomes necessary to acknowledge this aspect of method in studying 
homelessness or any other subject. Investigating the world is an exercise in ontological 
politi s Mol, ; La , , a  e e ise i  the p odu tio  of ealities: a politi s that has 
to do with the way in which problems are framed, bodies are shaped and lives are pushed 
a d pulled i to o e shape o  a othe  Mol, : iii . It is, ho e e , e essa  to ake this 
selection explicit and to seek to develop methodologies that enable fluid, complex and 
sometimes incoherent realities to be produced, rejecting the exclusivity of any particular 
reality, specifically the one that is currently dominant. Ontological politics is an integral part 
of any method: it is through it that we make the choice about which realities are made 
present and which are made absent. However, quantification and pathological 
individualization are exercises in a covert ontological politics which does not acknowledge – 
in fact, rejects – its nature as an ontological politics. They produce knowledge and realities 
but in the same process they deny that they do so. They choose the reality they produce, at 
the same time choosing the knowledge about it that is made present, whilst denying that 
they do so. They locate the realities they produce outside their own methodological 
practices, denying that they influence them whilst producing knowledge about them. In this 
way, they reduce discussion of homelessness to questions of perspective: they argue that the 
reality is the same but the perspectives on it are different. Howeve , if the ealit  is the 
sa e,  gi e  that ua tifi atio  a d pathologi al i di idualizatio  p ese t the sel es as the 
a epted o e t  ethods, thei  pe spe ti e  o  this ealit , hi h is e te io  to the 
practices, cannot fail to be correct.10 If the pe spe ti e  is the o e t o e,  the  it ust 
also e e lusi e, gi e  that the alte ati e pe spe ti es  ust e o g.  This egatio  
for the sake of methodological domination is unsustainable, and what is rendered invisible by 
these presences is too i po ta t to e ai  a se t. Fe e a e d s  logi  ust e 
                                                        
9
 “ee La   fo  a oade  dis ussio  of the elatio ship et ee  p ese e,  a ifest a se e  a d 
a se e as Othe ess  i pli it . 
10
 O  at least, it ould o e to e, gi e  that e tai  i o  i p e isio s a e e og ised i  the p a ti al 
application of the method. 
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e og ized as fu da e tal i  ethodologi al p a ti e: a thi g goes,  p o ided that it is 
justified. Any reality that is produced is legitimate, provided that the fact that we are 
producing it and the way in which we do so are duly explained. However, whilst it may be 
legitimate to produce all realities, not all of them are desirable. It is here that ontological 
politics becomes particularly relevant. Opting for the reality that does not conceal 
domination or the one that makes those living on the streets responsible for living on the 
streets are substantially different choices, and a researcher who is concerned with human 
dignity cannot be complicit in the production of the latter.  
If quantification and pathological individualization are not the path(s) to follow, this is, to 
a large extent, due to the profoundly decontextualized nature of the statements they make. 
The knowledge they produce is related to a particular context – a particular reality – but the 
part of the process that leads to the annihilation of its own influence on the production of 
reality conceals the space-time of this reality. It turns that which is local knowledge (which all 
knowledge is)11 i to u i e sal  k o ledge. A eality produced in a specific way in a concrete 
space-time thus becomes the reality, not only for this time and space but for many others as 
well.  
O e of the ai  p o le s of the do i a t egi e of t uth is this u i e sal  atu e. To a 
large extent it is by denying its parochialism that the reality it produces may be presented as 
singular and exterior. It is only possible to fight against this if contextual research into 
homelessness makes its contextualisation explicit. In the positivist model of knowledge, 
universalism is seen as the prime objective of information produced by research. Yet this can 
only be achieved by the process of obscuring research practices, an integral part of which is 
the negation of the context in which they occur. A declared and concerned ontological 
politics can only exist to the extent that it is relative to specific situations. These cannot be 
made invisible; they are a fundamental part of the reality which the method seeks to make 
present. 
This research positioning regarding homeless ess a ot e affi ed as u i e sal.  It is 
ot generalizable  i  the positi ist se se – which should be translated as 
decontextualized.  I stead, a o e ed a d de la ed o tologi al politi s ust fu tio  
through a praxiography (Mol, 2002) of a specific context, an ethnography of the practices of a 
                                                        
11
 See Law (2004), Latour (1987) and Flyvbjerg (2011) on the local and contextual nature of all knowledge 
produced. 
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particular space-time.12 The concern with the injustice resulting from major power 
imbalances which amount to domination can only be transformed into a part of what we 
produce as present if the research field is approached intensively over a prolonged period.13 
The subjectivities of the actors, the resources they deploy to confront domination and 
survive, the discourses which homeless subjects incorporate, readapt, rearticulate, produce 
and circulate, their relations in areas outside the public eye, in short, a substantial part of the 
set of practices that make up the phenomenon cannot be observed when the realities we 
want to produce do not include them. They cannot be observed when what we are looking 
fo  a e the supe fi ial ai  t e ds  of the phe o e o , the ide tifi atio  p odu tio  of 
problems in terms of existing clinical frameworks or the dominant representations of the 
a o al  ha a te  of the u dese i g poo .  Ho eless ess u de stood as do ination 
requires an approach to what lies beyond what is immediately visible when we look at life on 
the streets. When the interest lies in making unjust power relations present, we also have to 
look at hat is taki g pla e i  the a kstages  Goff a , 9) of social life, in the hidden 
transcripts (Scott, 1985, 1990) of dominated actors.14 Looking at these realities does not 
allow us to look at others. Once again, what is important is to make explicit that the reality 
that a clear and concerned ontological politics wants to produce is that of the relational 
production of power, not as an end in itself, but as part of a wider ontological politics. As 
previously stated, all realities are equally legitimate but not all are equally desirable. Making 
present the reality of the relational production of power in homelessness is desirable to the 
extent that it is perceived as unjust and degrading. The political exercise includes fighting this 
reality. Yet it is only by producing it as present in all its complexity – the first step in a 
declared and concerned ontological politics – that it is possible to fight it and seek to create 
                                                        
12
 “i e Nels A de so  ; A de so  a d ‘aut  , the fi st lassi  efe e e i  ho eless ess esea h 
in academia, it is clear that this phenomenon has to be the subject of contextualised and prolonged 
ethnographic study. 
13
 The recent ethnographies by Gowan (2010) and Bourgois and Schonberg (2009), curiously both carried out in 
San Francisco, offer excellent examples of the possibility of studying homelessness in ways which criticise the 
dominant regime of truth, proposing the construction of alternative realities for life on the streets, and 
emphasising the enormous power differences and structural and interactional injustices in the lives of homeless 
actors. Whilst it is possible to disagree with the particular positions taken by the authors, both works are 
exemplary not only for the profound knowledge they reveal of the realities studied but also for their committed 
stance towards fighting this domination and injustice and the fact that they explicitly assume the position of 
authors in the field. 
14
 In this respect the good example of research provided by Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) should be noted. 
Their photo-ethnography of homeless addicts in San Francisco is an interesting exercise in studying what takes 
place precisely in social spaces of difficult access for researchers. 
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another, more just, reality that does not include people living on the streets – the second 
political ontological step.  
 
A conclusion... 
... must be rejected, given that the process is open and ongoing. The methodological 
positio i g defe ded he e does ot ai  to p ese t itself as the path  fo  esea h to follo , 
but one possible path. The details of contextual findings can only be approached and 
esol ed o te tuall . P o idi g u i e sal  ethodologi al guideli es fo  app oa hi g 
specific fields of research is nonsensical and counterproductive. It hinders good research. We 
need rules, but contextual rules, adapted to the occasion (Feyerabend, 1993; Law, 2004; 
Flyvbjerg, 2011). What validates the sharing of the knowledge we produce is not the fact of 
using the same procedures in different space-times but the explicitness of the different ways 
of doing what we do. This is the main problem with the dominant regime of truth in 
homelessness research. It produces too many negations, reduces the scope of the possible to 
what already exists, so that it no longer makes sense to think of a better (different) world 
than the one that already exists, given that this becomes the best (only) world possible. It 
egates the esea h o te t th ough p ete sio s to u i e salis  a d does ot 
acknowledge parts of this context due to methodological standardisation. It denies that it 
produces reality(ies), that it produces presences and invisibilities. It denies that it is possible 
to produce alternative realities using alternative methods. The dominant regime of truth 
rejects its political ontological nature. The only defensible general rule is that of explicitness: 
a thi g goes,  ut e ha e to e a a e of hat e a e doi g a d a ou t fo  ho  e do 
it. This will vary according to the context being investigated but, in the particular case of 
homelessness, it cannot make injustice and domination invisible. Rejecting the 
methodological domination of the regime of truth discussed is the first step towards 
approaching and fighting the praxiological domination (which must be) present in 
homelessness.  
 
Translated by Sheena Caldwell 
Revised by the author and Teresa Tavares 
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